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Abstract 
We use an iterative methodology to calculate Pigouvian tolls when 
the street is shared by cars and buses. We compare scenarios where: 
1) the toll is calculated, conventionally, considering only the exter-
nality over other vehicles; 2) the toll is calculated considering the 
impact over other vehicles’ passengers; 3) no tolls are applied; 4) no 
tolls are applied, but some lanes or streets are reserved for buses. 
The methodology is applied first to a synthetic-model that considers 
homogeneity of demand and some level of heterogeneity of supply. 
Then, the methodology is extended to a city-model, a simultaneous 
four-stage model calibrated with real data from Santiago, Chile. 
Results show that when the externality over passengers is consi-
dered, car tolls in roads of mixed-use are significantly higher than 
conventionally estimated and, consequently, car flows shrink on 
those roads. Simulation results also show that the outcome of the 
reservation of capacity for buses depends on a careful design of this 
policy and could range from a social detriment, to be significantly 
superior to Pigouvian pricing. Experiments also show that, if bus’ paths 
are fixed, tolls calculated considering the externality over vehicle’s 
users may result in a social detriment. Finally, all Pigouvian pricing 
scenarios in the city-model resulted in a reduction in social welfare. 
This remarkable result can be attributed to: 1) the fact that the city-
model tends to simile general equilibrium, whereas Pigouvian tolls 
are calculated from a partial equilibrium perspective; 2) limitations 
of the city-model or a manifestation of Coase’s counterexample for 
Pigouvian taxation, resulting from the fact that agent’s opportunity 
cost is heterogeneous. We finish discussing the impact of these fin-
dings in policy analysis.
Keywords: congestion pricing; Pigouvian taxes; public transpor-
tation; bus lanes; bus streets.
Resumen
En este trabajo se usa un método iterativo para calcular tarifas Pigou-
vianas cuando las vías son compartidas por autos y buses. Se comparan 
escenarios en los cuales: 1) la tarifa es calculada considerando sólo 
la externalidad sobre otros vehículos; 2)  la tarifa considera además 
la externalidad sobre los pasajeros de los vehículos; 3) no se aplican 
tarifas; y 4) no se aplican tarifas, pero algunas pistas son reservadas 
para el uso exclusivo de buses. El método es aplicado primero a un 
modelo idealizado que considera homogenidad de la demanda y cierto 
grado de heterogenidad en la oferta. Luego el método es aplicado en 
un experimento con datos reales basado en un modelo simultáneo 
de cuatro etapas calibrado para la ciudad de Santiago, Chile. Todos 
los experimentos muestran que cuando se considera la externalidad 
sobre los pasajeros de los vehículos, las tarifas Pigouvianas crecen 
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menor flujo de automóviles en dichas vías. Por otro lado, las simulacio-
nes con el modelo idealizado muestran que el efecto de la reservación 
de pistas depende fuertemente del diseño considerado. Respecto de la 
tarificación Pigouviana, el experimento con datos reales muestra, sor-
prendentemente, que dicha política resultaría ser inferior a un escenario 
en el cual no se aplican tarifas. Este resultado podría atribuirse a: 1) que 
el modelo con datos reales representa una situación de equilibrio general 
y en cambio las tarifas Pigouvianas se calculan usando un enfoque de 
equilibrio parcial; 2) limitaciones de modelación en el experimento con 
datos reales; o 3) una manifestación del contraejemplo de Coase para los 
impuestos Pigouvianos. El artículo termina discutiendo el impacto de 
estos resultados en el análisis de políticas de transporte urbano.
Palabras clave: tarificación por congestión; impuestos Pigouvianos; 
transporte público; carriles solo bus; calles solo bus.
1. INTRODUCTION
optimal allocation of limited resources is a fundamental problem of socie-
ty. When the cost perceived by the agents (private cost) differs from the 
cost caused by the agent to the whole society (marginal social cost), this 
allocation is not optimal. The difference between social and private cost is 
known as externality or external cost. Pigou [1] was the first to propose, 
correcting this distortion by applying a tax equivalent to the difference 
between social and private cost at equilibrium demand levels. These taxes 
were known afterwards on his behalf as Pigouvian taxes. 
Since the twenties, Pigouvian taxation theory quickly spread over many 
knowledge fields, eventually reaching the transportation area [2]. The 
conventional way to determine Pigouvian taxes in transportation systems 
starts assuming that the value of time is equal across the population; that 
only cars make up the system; that each person drives alone; and that only 
travel time matters, ignoring noise, pollution, visual intrusion, accidents, 
delays caused by cars to other road users like buses, trucks and pedestrians. 
Under those assumptions Piguovian taxes will correspond to expression 
(1) where tmg_soc and tpriv correspond to marginal social and private travel 
times respectively.
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Pigouvian Tax (Toll) = Mg_SocCost (      ) − PrivCost(     ) =











marginal social time can be calculated as in expression (2) where two 
components can be distinguished. The first corresponds to the time percei-
ved by the driver and the other corresponds to the extra time his or her 
marginal trip causes over all the drivers. Since private time is subtracted 
from marginal social time in (1), only the second term in (2) remains in the 
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This research is primarily motivated in studying the effect of relaxing 
one of the assumptions described above. The main hypothesis is that, in 
the presence of buses on mixed-use roads, when marginal social costs are 
considered at the level of people instead of vehicles, optimal tolls would 
become considerably higher than usually estimated, making them, as a 
consequence, almost uncollectible [3]. Accordingly, the second hypothesis 
is that a reserved bus-lanes or bus-streets policy would become a potential 
surrogate or complement for optimal congestion pricing.
Mohring [4], Viton [5] and Small [6] are some of a few examples where 
this research question has been partially studied by means of synthetic 
microeconomic models. our research extends their theoretical approach 
by considering a synthetic-model that includes a substitute route and then 
by performing a simulation with a city-model considering heterogeneity in 
supply and demand, based in  four-stage simulating model ESTRAUS [7], 
calibrated with real data from the city of Santiago de Chile.
The structure of the article continues as follows. In section 2 the theoreti-
cal formulation of the marginal social cost curves in an aggregated-static 
framework is analyzed, considering explicitly the impact on bus and car 
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users. In section 3 two variations of a synthetic-model are simulated, under 
the theoretical framework considered in the previous section. In section 4 is 
presented the application and analysis of this framework to the city-model 
calibrated with real data is reported. In the final section, main results are 
summarized and their potential broader consequences are analyzed.
2.  EXTERNALITIES CONSIDERING PEOPLE INSTEAD 
 OF VEHICLES IN MIXED-USE STREETS.
Consider the case where buses and cars share the road. We will concentrate 
on the analytic derivation of Pigouvian taxes under this scenario, which 
remains a simple task thanks to other simplifying assumptions are still 
considered.
In the case of car externalities, marginal social cost of an additional trip by 
car should account not only for car riders, but also for bus passengers as 
well. This is shown in expression (3), where pb corresponds to the number 
of bus passengers riding on this street, λ is a scalar that accounts for the 
additional travel time of a bus compared to a car and η corresponds to 
average car occupancy.
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]





















































Under this framework, private travel time of each car rider will correspond 
to the first term in brackets in expression (3). Externality in this case has 
two components, one corresponds to the externality over other car users, 
and the second represents the externality caused to bus users. For streets 
with a significant amount of people traveling by bus, this last term, usua-
lly neglected in traditional calculation of Pigouvian tolls, would become 
substantially big, rapidly surpassing the size of the second term.
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This implies that Pigouvian car tolls for mixed-use roads should be substan-
tially higher than usually estimated. This argument supports the hypotheses 
suggested in section one. on one hand, higher car tolls will imply an addi-
tional burden on the already low public popularity in regards to congestion 
pricing. on the other hand, higher car tolls would imply a reduced number 
of cars on the roads of mixed-use, a result that could, to some extent, be 
replicated by means of the reservation of lanes for the exclusive use of buses. 
The externalities caused by bus riders remains to be analyzed. If it is assu-
med, for simplicity, that bus frequencies are continuously adjusted to carry 
each additional passenger, bus riders’ marginal social cost could be derived 
as in (4), where K corresponds to bus capacity, γ corresponds to the car 
equivalence of each bus in term of the use of road space and λ corresponds 
to the additional travel time experienced by bus riders, compared to car 
drivers in the same road.
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It can be immediately noted that bus riders externality is multiplied by the 
factor ηγ/K times the car Pigouvian tax. In general, this factor will be around 
1/20th. Thus, for the rest of the analysis in this article this externality can 
be safely neglected.
3. SIMULATION OF TWO SYNTHETIC-MODELS
In this section a synthetic-model of modal split and traffic assignment is 
developed. The model corresponds to an extension of the model considered 
in [8]. It is very simplistic in order to allow a clean analysis of the dynamic 
effect of the inclusion of the externality over bus riders in the calculation 
of Pigouvian tolls as demand and supply varies.
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3.1 Models Description
Two assignment models were considered: a Symmetrical model and an 
Asymmetrical model. both consider a single origin-destination pair (A - 
b) and two routes. one of such routes (Route 1) considers exclusively cars 
and the other (Route 2) considers mixed traffic of buses and cars as shown 
in Figure 1. 
Route 1: only cars
Route 2: cars and buses
Figure 1. Description of the Traffic Assignment Models
Volume-delay curves of each route are of bureau of Public Roads (bPR) type 
[9]. For the Symmetrical model both volume delay functions are equal to 
(5), where fbi corresponds to bus frequency, which is zero for route 1 since 
buses are not allowed on it. This model could represent the Center business 
District of a city in which supply and demand is evenly distributed and 




















In the case of the Asymmetrical model, the bPR function for route 2 is equal 
to (5), but for route 1 it is equal to (6). The idea of this second exercise is to 
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resemble cases where longer routes with plenty of capacity are available, 




















To estimate the modal split between bus and car, it was considered that 
each decision-maker maximizes his or her indirect utility, conditional on 
the chosen mode. In turn, this utility function has a deterministic and a 
random component. The random component is assumed to be distributed 
extreme value (0,μ=1) which allows the percentage (or probability) of users 
choosing each mode (Pbus and Pcar) to be estimated by a multinomial logit 
model (see e.g. [9]). In turn, the deterministic component of the utility 
is considered to depend linearly only upon mode travel time (tmode), bus 
waiting time (tw_mode) and, in the case of cars, upon the toll (ccar). The utility 
coefficient of travel time is assumed to be equal to minus Subjective Value 
of Travel Time Savings (SVTTS) (=0.01), and the coefficient of waiting time 
is assumed to be four times the one of travel time. Note that this configu-
ration of modal utilities implies that they are in the same units as car cost 
and willingness to pay. Note also that willingness to pay for traveling is not 
considered, since it cancels out for each person’s discrete choice process. 
Under this framework, modal split model can be summarized as shown 
in expression (7). Note that, for simplicity, bus fares and non-toll car costs 





















As shown in Figure 2, for a given level of total exogenous demand, equi-
librium is attained iteratively when the level of service of the modal split 
and of traffic assignment models are consistent. Convergence criteria con-
sidered flow differences below 1E-08. The flow of buses is not optimized 
but instead determined as the flow required to exactly carry pb passengers 
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considering a vehicle capacity of K=40 people. Waiting time is calculated as 
half of bus headway (assuming uniform arrivals) and the impact of buses 
on the volume-delay curves is calculated as the flow of buses multiplied by 
a car-equivalency factor of γ=2.5. Finally there were considered coefficients 
of λ =1.15 for the extra travel time for buses and of η = 1.25 for the average 
number of persons by car.
Traffic Assignment Model
Pareto (Wardrop) equilibrium for cars
considering specific volume-delay curves
in each case (Fig.1) 
Modal Split Model
Multinonial Logit model (Eq. 7)
Total Demand
Exogenous
tbus , tcar ,tw_bus ,Cc
Pbus , Pcar
Figure 2. Description of the Simulating Procedure
The set of coefficients considered for the model was built following stan-
dards usually observed in practice. Other sets of coefficients were tested 
without significantly modifying either the analysis or the conclusions of 
this research. As stated before, the objective of this stage of the research 
is to study the dynamics of the system upon changes in exogenous total 
demand. The corroboration of the conclusions derived at this stage will be 
checked and complemented with the simulating model based on real data 
considered in the next section.
Under this framework the following four simulation experiments were 
developed, considering in each case exogenous levels of total demand of 
200 and 400 total trips.
i. Users’ Equilibrium (UE): Equilibrium that is reached spontaneously 
without any intervention on the system. It is the result of the fact that 
each individual maximizes his or her own utility independently. In 
our framework, it corresponds to considering Pareto or Wardrop [9] 
equilibrium conditions with the volume-delay curves shown in (5) 
and (6).
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ii. Partial Pigouvian Tolls (PPT): Corresponds to the conventional way 
to determine Pigouvian tolls where only externalities over car users are 
considered. In our framework, it corresponds to considering  Wardrop 
equilibrium with volume-delay curves that include the externality 
caused over car users, that is, the first and second component of 
expression (3), divided by η.
iii. Full Pigouvian Tolls (FPT): Corresponds to the alterative way to 
determine Pigouvian tolls, including not only externalities over car 
users, but also over bus passengers. In our framework, it corresponds 
to considering Wardrop equilibrium conditions with volume-delay 
curves that include all the three components of expression (3), divided 
by η. For simplicity, externality caused by bus passengers (4) was not 
considered in this equilibrium.
iv. Transit Exclusive Link Equilibrium (TELE): Corresponds to a UE 
where cars are not allowed to use the mixed-use route (Route 2).
3.2  Analysis of simulations results
Table 1 shows the principal results of simulated situations. In terms of the 
main hypothesis suggested in section one; results confirm that Pigouvian 
tolls become considerably higher than usually estimated when the exter-
nality over bus riders is considered. FPT tolls in the mixed-use route range 
between 13% and 100% higher than equivalent PPT tolls, depending on 
the model and levels of demand considered. In the case of the Symmetric 
model, this effect is also extended to the alternative route (route 1) because 
of the car migration from the mixed-use route that is highly tolled in the 
FPT case. FPT tolls in car-only routes range between 32% and 67% higher 
than equivalent PPT tolls. In the case of Asymmetric model, tolls remain 
null in route 1, since the capacity available allows serving the demand with 
free flow travel times.
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Table 1. Symmetric and Asymmetric Synthetic-models. 
Analysis of outputs
Equilibrium Output










Average Travel Time [s] 12 20 19 25
Bus Modal Split [%] 50 57 55 55
Toll on Route 1 [$] 3 31 0 0
Toll on Route 2 [$] 3 29 24 23
Cars on Route 2 [veh/h] 47 80 82 75
FPT
Average Travel Time [s] 12 16 17 22
Bus Modal Split [%] 51 62 56 57
Toll on Route 1 [$] 5 41 0 0
Toll on Route 2 [$] 6 49 27 29
Cars on Route 2 [veh/h] 38 53 63 45
TELE
Average Travel Time [s] 15 31 24 24
Bus Modal Split [%] 52 62 57 57
Toll on Route 1 [$] - - - -
Toll on Route 2 [$] - - - -
Cars on Route 2 [veh/h] - - - -
UE
Average Travel Time [s] 12 26 22 43
Bus Modal Split [%] 49 49 54 48
Toll on Route 1 [$] - - - -
Toll on Route 2 [$] - - - -
Cars on Route 2 [veh/h] 47 94 92 117
In terms of the second hypothesis stated in section one; results do not 
fully confirm that devoting all the capacity of the mixed-use route for the 
use of cars would work as a surrogate for Pigouvian congestion pricing. 
Although TELE resembles almost identically the modal split attained with 
FPT, average travel times are considerably worse for TELE, and even worse 
than UE for the Symmetric model. Although it can be argued that, hidden 
in this average, bus riders’ travel time is indeed always smaller in TELE 
than in FPT or UE, it would be inappropriate to propose a public policy 
which might decrease social wellbeing by increasing people’s travel time. 
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Additionally, in terms of car flow on mixed-use route, the FPT case is far 
from being zero, which is indeed the more remarkable difference between 
this equilibrium and TELE. Despite this flow decreases with demand and, 
for higher levels, the numbers between FPT and TELE approach each other, 
the validity of the BPR curves over 400 [trips/h] is questionable. 
These results motivated the simulation of an additional experiment where 
only half of mixed-use routes were exclusively devoted to buses for the Sym-
metric model and for a demand of 400 [trips/h]. This experiment, resulted 
in a reduction of bus modal split (55%) compared to TELE but, notably, it 
also attained an important reduction in average travel time down to 21 [s]. 
Although this average travel time is not as good as the one attained with 
FPT, it is better than UE and almost equal to PPT and, remarkably, the bus 
riders’ travel time in this case is 20% lower than in FPT. This result could 
be interpreted as that only a detailed implementation of bus priority mea-
sures would ensure the achievement of public policy objectives partially 
similar to the social equilibrium that could be attained through Pigouvian 
congestion pricing.
Now, to complete the analysis of the hypothesis under study, Table 2 
summarizes the social welfare analysis of the modeled experiments. For 
each case are shown the total user’s surplus, the toll collected and the total 
social welfare.
Since in this experiment logit demand functions were considered and utilities 
were considered in money units, user’s surplus could be calculated as the 
summation of each person’s willingness to pay (WP) and their expected 
maximum utility EMU (see e.g. [10]). Total social welfare will correspond to 
the sum of users’ surplus and the toll collected. This is shown in expression 
(8) were μ corresponds to the scale factor of the extreme value distribution 
considered for the derivation of the logit model, ζ corresponds to the Eu-
ler constant (~0.577) and D corresponds to the total demand considered 
for each scenario. The scale factor μ is not identifiable and will thus be set 
equal to one as usual.
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However, note that modal utilities in (7) correspond to conditional-indirect-
truncated utility functions. This implies that no information is available on 
actual willingness to pay for traveling and thus, only differences between 
scenarios are meaningful. This also allows the term ζ/μ to be safely ignored. 
Table 2 presents the results considering UE as the base case. 
Table 2. Synthetic-models. Welfare 
Analysis Considering UE as Base [$]
Equilibrium Output
Symmetric Supply Asymmetric Supply
200 trips 400 trips 200 trips 400 trips
PPT
Δ Users’ Surplus -3 -32 4 54
Toll Collected 243 4183 1534 1397
Δ Total Social Welfare 240 4150 1538 1452
FPT
Δ Users’ Surplus -5 -37 9 68
Toll Collected 428 5421 1375 1065
Δ Total Social Welfare 424 5384 1384 1134
TELE
Δ Users’ Surplus -6 -29 13 72
Toll Collected - - - -
Δ Total Social Welfare -6 -29 13 72
Consider the Symmetric model first. It can be immediately noted that, as 
asserted by Hau [11, 12], the user’s surplus under congestion pricing can 
be negative. This means that both car and bus users are worse with conges-
tion pricing with FPT and PPT. For example for 400 [trips/h], although the 
average travel time for FPT is 40% shorter than for UE, users also have to 
face a toll which more than compensates the reduction in travel time. This 
makes clear the reason for the unpopularity of congestion pricing and serves 
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as one of the pillars for the hypothesis about the potential convenience of 
reserving capacity for buses.
only after collected toll is considered as a society gain, does total social 
welfare become positive. It has to be recalled however that this implies 
that collecting the tolls is costless, which is very far from true. In the case 
of London, 43% of collected tolls are used to run the congestion pricing 
system [13]. Also regarding total social welfare, according to what would be 
expected; this number is greater for FPT than for PPT, since marginal social 
cost FPT considers the full externality effect in the calculation of the tolls. 
In terms of unpopularity, if collected tolls can be somehow directly re-
turned to drivers as a lump-sum, they will actually perceive the benefits 
of congestion pricing. however, it is not clear how this returned money 
could not change drivers’ behavior back to the situation previous to the 
toll. moreover, even if that innocuous lump-sum re-assignment would 
be possible, the net effect of such action on other markets is not clear. For 
example, Parry and Bento [14] showed that, if the labor market were not 
optimally taxed, congestion pricing and lump-sum returns to drivers would 
imply a net social negative benefit. 
The case of TELE is again disappointing at first sight. Consistent with the 
increase in average travel time showed in Table 2, users’ surplus and total 
social welfare is worse for TELE than for UE. however, in the case of the 
additional experiment considering that only half of the capacity of the mixed- 
use route is devoted to the exclusive use of buses, social welfare gain also 
turn to be positive compared to the UE case (+21 for the 400 [trips/h] case). 
Summarizing up to this point, although congestion pricing shows the major 
social welfare results, it is remarkable that these benefits come only from 
collected tolls and that transportation system users will directly perceive a 
negative effect of congestion pricing. on the other hand, if a detailed imple-
mentation of bus priority measures are considered, not only a net positive 
social welfare could be attained, but also a positive users’ perception of it.
Consider now the Asymmetric model. Remarkably, some of the results 
justified above for the Symmetrical model are no longer valid. Note first 
that for TELE, users’ surplus is larger than for UE. This occurs because, in 
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this case, route 1 has enough capacity to accommodate the cars traveling 
through at almost free flow time and thus with null tolls. The case where 
only half of the capacity is devoted to buses, as expected, has even larger 
benefits.
Users’ surplus for PPT and FPT are also positive. This arguably occurs for 
the same reason exposed for TELE. In this case, drivers have an un-tolled 
and un-congested alternative and thus the effect of marginal pricing is 
a win-win situation. This is precisely the very famous seminal “narrow 
and wide roads” example used by Pigou [1] to illustrate the convenience 
of governmental intervention through road pricing to reduce congestion.
At first sight, it is an intriguing result that, for FPT, social welfare is smaller 
than for PPT. Since in FPT externalities are fully accounted for, it would 
be reasonable to expect better results for it. one possibility for explaining 
this result would be that the bus riders’ externality (4) was not considered 
in the model. however, an additional model considering this effect was 
developed without attaining significant changes.
Another possible explanation comes from an interpretation of the reciprocal 
nature of the externalities, as explained by Coase [15]. The implementation 
of the FPT pricing produces an “extenality” over the toll collection agency 
by reducing the amount of drivers paying the toll and, it turns out that, for 
this example, the loss of tolled drivers is larger than the valuation of their 
savings in travel time because of the implementation of the toll.
An alternative possibility is that Pigouvian taxes do not work correctly 
because bus paths are not optimized in anyway. In this specific experiment, 
it would maybe be of benefit to have some of the buses riding in the route 
with high capacity and virtually no marginal effects. A model of such 
characteristics was performed for the 400 [trips/h]. This model attained a 
total social welfare which, compared to UE of $1509, is better than the one 
obtained with PPT, this confirms the conjecture. 
This finding raises important questions. In a model applied to a real city, 
the optimal adaptation of bus frequencies is already an enormous task, 
but optimal redesign of bus routes is even many times more complex. The 
questions are: how costly would it be to consider non-optimal bus systems 
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routes in the determination of optimal road pricing? Would this potentially 
imply a net negative benefit of the implementation of congestion pricing? 
These questions will be partially addressed in the following section by the 
analysis of four-stage simultaneous city model calibrated with real data.
4. SIMULATION OF THE CITY-MODEL
Given that results depend upon supply and demand assumptions, it is 
indispensable to study an empirical case. Since empirical evidence, in the 
broad sense of the word, is almost always impractical in this field, the best 
chance is to analyze the effect of the problems under study is with what 
we denominate a city-model, a simulation model which considers diverse 
degree of heterogeneity of supply and demand, many levels of interaction 
resembling the situation observed in a real urban transportation system 
and that was calibrated with real data. The model used for this purpose is 
to the four-stages simultaneous model ESTRAUS, which was calibrated with 
real data from the city of Santiago de Chile for the year 2001 [16] and that 
has been continuously used and validated for diverse modeling purposes 
and users.
beyond the usage of real data, the detailed topology and interaction of 
different modes, this model considers additional features that make its 
behavior substantially more sophisticated than the synthetic-model con-
sidered in section 3. Principally, for our objectives, it could be mentioned 
that it considers trip distribution and also models 13 users’ categories which 
not only have different demand models, but also have different values of 
time when assigned to the transportation network. Additionally, the bus 
system considers bus waiting time penalties for overcrowding and a state 
of the art transit assignment procedure. The ESTRAUS model considered 
represents the morning peak of this urban system and is compounded by 
630 traffic analysis zones, 6182 links, 1.2 millions trips, three trip purposes 
(work, study and others) and eleven transportation modes, including car, 
bus, metro, taxi, and walking. It has to be mentioned however that, the 
increased sophistication of the city-model is not free. There is a trade-off 
between complexity and analysts’ ability to interpret the results. only 
with the wise combination of simple and sophisticated models, interesting 
conclusions could be achieved.
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one important difference with the model considered in this section compared 
to the one of the previous, corresponds to that in this case, bus frequencies 
were not adjusted as bus demand changed. The reason to work as such was 
that, because of network effects, it is not direct to modify bus frequencies in 
a real scheme and furthermore, the results in such case would be substan-
tially affected by potentially arbitrary decisions on the adjustments. on the 
other hand, leaving frequencies fixed would only reinforce the hypothesis 
under study by attenuating the migration of people from cars to buses for 
the different scenarios considered. This occurs because waiting time will 
get increased, instead of decreased, as bus demand grows, since frequencies 
are not adjusted and because ESTRAUS considers a bus capacity penalty to 
reflect the probability of not finding space in an incoming bus.
Six scenarios were analyzed using the city-model: Base: equilibrium con-
sidering non road congestion pricing, and no bus reserved lanes; Base + 
Cordon Pricing:  A scenario where a cordon road congestion pricing scheme 
that was recently proposed for Santiago emulating London’s experience; 
Base + Car Externality Toll: Equilibrium considering road congestion 
pricing but only in terms of the externality that car users cause over other 
car users, that is, referring to the second component of expression (3); 
Base + Car and Bus Externality Toll: Equilibrium considering congestion 
pricing including also the externality that car users cause over bus users, 
that is, the second and the third components of expression (3); Base + Bus 
P7 Exclusive Streets: Considers a set of bus reserved streets across the 
city that was applied by the chilean authorities in the year 2001 as part of 
a practical bus enhancement plan [17]; and Base + Bus lanes Full Vuchic 
Criteria: Considers a scenario where more than 2000 links were intervened 
by devoting a portion of their capacity for the exclusive use of buses. This 
detailed design was developed based on Vuchic [18] criteria, wich consist 
in allowing a similar amount of people by mode per lane, but being careful 
of always leaving, at least, one lane for the use of cars in all the network. 
Special details about this design can be found in Davila [19].
Although all the scenarios were developed using the software ESTRAUS, 
the third and fourth scenarios have an important difference. Since ES-
TRAUS is designed to model UE, Pigouvian tolls for such scenarios had 
to be estimated iteratively, calculating each Pigouvian toll externally, until 
convergence was attained [19].
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Table 3 shows the main results of modal split attained for each scenario. 
Consistent with what was obtained in the synthetic-model, it can be noted 
that full congestion pricing implied the most important effect in modal 
split in favor to bus.
Table 3. Modal Split. Santiago 2001 AM Peak City-model [%]
Scenario Car Driver Bus
Base 19.0 39.4
Base + Cordon Pricing 17.5 41.7
Base + Car Externality Toll 9.90 53.4
Base + Car and Bus Externality Toll 7.10 56.0
Base + Bus-P7-Exclusive Streets 18.5 40.1
Base + Bus Lanes Full Vuchic Criteria 18.6 41.3
Table 4 shows average tolls per trip implied by each pricing scheme. This 
table confirms the hypothesis that, when the externality over the people 
riding buses is considered, Pigouvian tolls rise dramatically. Note that, 
compared to the case where only the externality over other cars is consi-
dered, average toll per tolled link becomes twice as big. Also remarkably, 
in terms of tolls collected per car driver, Pigouvian tolls are more than 3.5 
times the average tolls actually considered in a practical proposition of 
cordon pricing for the city of Santiago. Consistent with this hypothesis as 
well, in the scenario where bus and car externalities were considered, 75% 
of the tolls collected correspond to the effect of bus externalities. 
It can also be noted that comparing car and bus externalities, tolls are con-
centrated in fewer links, which can be shown to correspond, principally, 
to the ones with buses. Although the tolls are higher, their concentration 
allows car drivers to avoid them more easily, which explains, together with 
the reduced number of car drivers, the reduction in toll collection. 
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Table 4. Toll Collection and Composition of Average 















Base --- --- --- ---
Base + Cordon Pricing 25,112 0.12 1.25 78
Base + Car Externality Toll 83,377 0.69 0.15 2,885
Base + Car and Bus Externality Toll** 60,879 0.71 0.29 1,857
Base + Bus-P7 Exclusive Streets --- --- --- ---
Base + Bus Lanes Full Vuchic criteria --- --- --- ---
* Total toll collection / Number of trips. Ch$/ US$ [2001]= 604.48
** Bus externality accounts for 75% of the collected toll
Table 5 shows the users’ surplus and the users’ surplus plus the toll collec-
tion or “recycling”, which will be treated, for simplicity, as the total social 
welfare. It stands out that P7 Bus-Exclusive Streets and the detailed Bus 
Lanes Full Vuchic Criteria scenarios are the only ones that produce net social 
benefits compared to the Base. Of these two, the detailed design of bus-
lanes by means of the Vuchic criteria resulted in the highest social benefits.
Cordon pricing and Car externally toll scenarios resulted in negative net 
social welfares. This can be argued to be a result of the application of non 
optimal pricing schemes in the sense of considering the externality over bus 
riders. This is consistent with what was found by Verhoef and Small [20]. 
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Table 5. Social Welfare. Santiago 2001 
AM Peak City-model w/r Base [US$]*
Scenario
Users Surplus 
“Rule of half method”
Total Social Welfare 
US + Recycling 
Base + Cordon Pricing -771,980 -746,871
Base + Car Externality Toll -3,949,205 -3,865,821
Base + Car and Bus Externality Toll -4,162,303 -4,101,425
Base + P7 Bus-Exclusive Streets 11,784 11,784
Base + Bus Lanes Full Vuchic Criteria 275,931 275,931
* Ch$/ US$ [2001] = 604.48
 
However, to find that Car and Bus Externality toll ends up resulting in a 
negative social benefit is a rather complicated outcome, since the conside-
ration of the second effect was the main motivation for this research. In 
this case, it could be argued that the bus system is not optimized in terms 
of bus frequencies but more importantly, in terms of route designs. This is 
indeed true and relevant in this complicated network and proved to play 
a role in the synthetic-model analyzed in section 3. however, this could 
hardly account for making this scenario the worst among the analyzed. 
one fundamental difference between the synthetic-model considered in 
section 3 and the city-model of the current section is the consideration of 
differences in the value of time among users’ classes. To show how the 
results change under this new scenario, consider again that only cars make 
up the system, but that users’ are distributed among K groups of size qk 
with different values of time VTk. In such case, marginal social cost for a 
car user which belongs to a class j, could be calculated as in (9).
 


















Assuming that marginal impact on travel time of car users is equal among 
users’ classes and recalling that private cost of car users of class j should be 
discounted in the calculation of the toll, Pigouvian tax should corresponds 
to (10) and will be equal for all users of each link. 
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Instead, Pigouvian tolls in the city-model so far were calculated just as the 
difference between social and private time multiplied by an average SVTTS. 
That was because no link-specific information on the composition of cars 
and bus riders is available in reality and neither considered to calculate 
the tolls in practice. however, this type of information can be partially 
recovered from the software ESTRAUS used to develop the city-model. 
Since ESTRAUS considers multi-class-assignment of cars, information on 
the value of time of the car drivers can the retrieved by 5 classes of users 
by each link in the network. In the case of public transportation passengers 
instead, only averages at the level of the whole system were available for 
the same five user classes.
Neglecting the effect of SVTTS specific distribution in the calculation of 
Pigouvian taxes would have important implications. both in the cases of 
the Car Externality and the Bus and Car Externality scenarios, if a link 
is used by persons with a small SVTSS, then Pigouvian taxes calculated 
with average SVTTS will be overestimated. In turn, if a link is transited 
by persons with a large SVTTS, Pigouvian taxes calculated with average 
SVTTS will be underestimated. In both cases, a negative effect will arise. 
In the overestimation case, users will be inappropriately diverted to other 
routes or modes and, on the underestimation case, users will be faced with 
non-optimal congestion levels.
This effect would be especially important in the case of the bus and Car ex-
ternality scenario. Since people with lower income and thus, shorter  SVTTS, 
will tend to migrate to the buses first, it can be expected that Pigouvian 
taxes calculated with average SVTTS will be  particularly overestimated for 
links with a great amount of bus riders. This effect explains, for example, 
why the car travel time in Table 6 for the bus and Car Externality scenario 
is even larger than for the base case, in spite of the fact that the number of 
cars in the street was importantly reduced (Table 3). The problem is that, 
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since tolls are over-dimensioned, car users are inefficiently forced to find 
longer routes to reach their destinations.
Table 6. Travel Time. Santiago 2001 





Base + Cordon Pricing 28.58 32.82
Base + Car Externality Toll 24.17 28.29
Base + Car and bus Externality Toll 29.82 26.80
Base + Bus-P7 Exclusive Streets 28.26 33.34
Base + Bus Lanes Full Vuchic criteria 27.28 26.59
* Ch$/ US$ [2001] = 604.48
Therefore, the final exercise with the city-model corresponded to the re-
calculation of the full Pigouvian tolls by link considering the correction 
proposed in expression (10) based in the data on the value of time which is 
available from the software ESTRAUS. Additionally, the model considered 
the adjustment of bus frequencies (but not bus paths) to the new bus demand 
using the software DIRTP [21]. This process was performed iteratively in 
a parallel procedure involving both modifications. 
This exercise resulted in a significant increase in the social welfare of the 
system for the full Pigouvian tolls since waiting time of buses was subs-
tantially reduced and the tolls were adjusted to the heterogeneity in the 
value of time observed across the city. The procedure however did not 
transform the net welfare effect of partial (conventional) or full Pigouvian 
congestion pricing into a positive, one it just reduced it to approximately 
a 50% of what is shown in Table 5. 
Several hypotheses can be raised to explain the unexpected result that Pi-
gouvian tolls resulted in a social detriment. The first possible explanation 
for this unexpected result is that, despite the sophistication of ESTRAUS, 
the model itself may not be suitable to account correctly for the Pigouvian 
tolls because the application of the tolls and the subsequent adjustment 
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of demand, and in some cases, also of supply, are maybe too far from the 
calibration point reducing the reliability of the model. An alternative ex-
planation for these results is that, as happened with the synthetic-model, 
the fact that bus’ paths were not adapted consistently with the application 
of the tolls, the situation is indeed suboptimal. however, this may explain 
why welfare is reduced when passing from the partial to the full Pigouvian 
tolls, but not why the welfare change in both cases is negative.
Another explanation for finding that Pigouvian tolls resulted in a social 
detriment in the city-model might be that this model tends to simile ge-
neral equilibrium, whereas Pigouvian tolls are calculated from a partial 
equilibrium perspective. Indeed, the demonstration that Pigouvian tolls 
lead to system optimum (see e.g. Sheffi [9]) considers the trip assignment 
problem alone, whereas the city-model applied using ESTRAUS, considers 
the simultaneous determination of modal split, trip distribution and trip 
assignment, a problem for which no formal demonstration of the optimality 
of Pigouvian tolls is available.
An additional hypothesis to explain for this result relies in the fact, stated 
originally by Coase [15], that Pigouvian taxation may result in a social 
detriment if the opportunity cost of the agents is heterogeneous, this is 
indeed the case in the city-model, and represents a crucial difference with 
the synthetic-model. Coase states that it is not enough to identify a gap bet-
ween private and social cost and to “correct” it by the application of a tax. 
To attain social optimum it is needed to identify the final outcome resulting 
from the application of the tax, which will depend upon the opportunity 
cost of the agents. In other words, in some cases it may be cheaper for the 
agent that is facing the externality, to just bear it, instead of always making 
the agent that is producing the externality to pay for it.
Coase’s argument in the case of transportation can be illustrated by the 
following example. Consider high-income group of individuals (with high 
value of time) that have to choose between commuting in the morning peak 
and telecommuting (having meetings by phone or other devices), where 
the second alternative may reduce their productivity to some extent. on the 
other hand, low-income commuters have to show up at work at any event. 
Without a Pigouvian toll, congestion may be large enough to make high-
income commuters to shift to telecommuting. Now, if the Pigouvian toll is 
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imposed, some high-income commuters may find it worth again to drive, 
rising the nominal value of the externality, and thus the toll, to a level that 
will eventually become unaffordable for the low-income commuters, which 
are then forced to use an extreme alternative, such as walking long distances 
to show up to work on time. If the additional cost borne by the low-income 
commuters sum up to a larger amount than the additional benefit perceived 
by the high-income commuters the effect of the Pigouvian toll will result in 
a social detriment. 
Further analysis of the validation of potential hypothesis to explain the 
unexpected result that Pigouvian tolls resulted in a social detriment, are 
left for further research.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we proposed and applied a methodology to calculate and si-
mulate Pigouvian tolls when the street is shared by cars and buses, analyzing 
the impact of considering first only the externality over the vehicles and 
then the full effect over vehicle’s users.
Simulation results showed, for both the synthetic-model and the city-model, 
that when the externality over passengers is considered, car tolls in mixed- 
use roads are significantly higher than usually estimated and, consequently, 
car flow shrinks towards zero. Regarding the reservation of capacity for 
buses, simulation results show that the outcome depends strongly on a 
careful design of this measure and could range from a social detriment to 
be superior to Pigouvian pricing. 
Some unexpected results resulted from the simulation models. The synthetic-
model application showed that if bus’ paths are fixed, full Pigouvian tolls, 
may result in a socially inferior equilibrium when compared with the con-
ventional tolls. one possible explanation for this unexpected result is that 
the situation with the modification of the bus paths is indeed suboptimal 
and the Pigouvian taxes will not necessarily work because we are facing a 
second best situation in this case. 
Additionally, in the city-model, all Pigouvian pricing scenarios resulted 
in a negative variation in social welfare. This remarkable result can be 
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attributed to: 1) the fact that the city-model tends to simile general equili-
brium, whereas Pigouvian tolls are calculated from a partial equilibrium 
perspective; 2) limitations of the city-model; 3) a manifestation of Coase’s 
counterexample for Pigouvian taxation, resulting from the fact that agent’s 
opportunity cost is heterogeneous. Further analysis of these hypotheses is 
left for further research.
The implications of these findings for policy analysis are diverse. First, if 
Pigouvian taxation is to be used, the consideration of the full externality 
might result in tolls that are so high that may probe impractical to imple-
ment. In that sense, a careful dedication of street capacity for the use of 
buses appears as an attractive surrogate for congestion pricing. moreover, 
compared to congestion pricing, a bus lanes policy does not have the pro-
blem of requiring recycling to achieve a raise in consumer’s surplus, and 
therefore, a raise in public support. Finally, the difficulties found in the 
calculation of Pigouvian toll in the city-model, and the finding that this 
policy may result in a social detriment, raises a warning sign in the sui-
tability of this policy. Further analysis of the argumentation of Coase [15] 
against Pigouvian theory, in the case of transportation systems, is needed.
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